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The best method to eliminate this seemingly unconquerable barrier of
the presumption of legitimacy, where the mother is married, would seem
to be by the use of blood tests, whenever possible, showing that her husband
was not the father of her child. 19 If the mother could eliminate the pre-
sumption of legitimacy by excluding her husband from any possibility of
being assumed to be the father, then she could obtain a favorable adjudica-
tion in her paternity action by proving the defendant to be the father of
her child by a mere preponderance of the evidence. Of course, the court
may always order the mother, child, and alleged father to submit to blood
tests; but the results of such tests are admissible in court only to exclude the
defendant as being the father of the child and never as affirmative proof of
guilt.20
T. RYDELL
TORTS-RES IPSA LOQUITUR-LIABILITY OF ROPE MANUFACTURER-A
recent decision of the Appellate Court of Illinois in May v. Columbian
Rope' serves to underscore the longevity and progression of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur.
The case arose out of an accident that occurred at a construction site
when a one-half inch, three-strand Manila line, manufactured by Colum-
bian, broke and caused the plaintiff to fall and sustain injuries. The
evidence presented by the plaintiff was entirely circumstantial, consist-
ing of the offending rope and the plaintiff's own testimony that on the
morning of the accident the rope was "brand new," having been delivered
to the job and placed in use only some 45 minutes before it broke. This
testimony was seemingly corroborated by the deposition of a fellow work-
man, and by the direct testimony of the man who delivered the rope to the
job site. A further point made by the delivery man was that the rope ap-
peared to be dirty when he delivered it, as if it had been used.
2
To rebut the inference of negligence arising from the circumstan-
tial evidence put forward by the plaintiff, the defendant, Columbian,
introduced extensive evidence pertaining to its manufacturing processes,
arguing that its testing and safety procedures "showed it to be in the
exercise of all due care in the manufacture of its rope.8 This evidence
was buttressed by the testimony of an expert witness that the "dirty" rope
in question was not new, as the plaintiff had testified. In concluding its
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 106 3/4, § 5.
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 106 3/4, § 1.
1 40 Ill. App. 2d 264, 189 N.E.2d 394 (1st Dist. 1963).
2 Id. at 279, 189 N.E.2d at 400. The court took notice of the fact that the workman
giving the deposition freely admitted that an illness had left him with an impaired mem-
ory and capacity for narration and that he was "hazy" about such events which had hap-
pened long ago.
3 Id. at 269, 189 N.E.2d at 396.
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presentation, the defendant called attention to the physical appearance
of the rope at the point of the break, emphasizing that it appeared to have
been rather sharply cut, all the strands being severed at the same point. A
demonstration conducted with test equipment, upon which similar rope
was broken, indicated that when a three-strand Manila line breaks, each
strand parts at a different point along the length of the rope.
At the close of the plaintiff's case, the court allowed the motion of
Columbian's co-defendant, Dietz Industrial Company,4 for a directed ver-
dict in its favor. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
against Columbian, whereupon Columbian filed motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial on the condition that such
judgment be reversed on appeal. The defendant's motions were allowed,
and the plaintiff appealed.
From the time the doctrine was first annunciated in 1863 by Chief
Baron Pollock, in Byrne v. Boadle,5 and the first attempt to state the
rule of that case by Chief Justice Earle in 1865,6 the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur has been held to apply to those situations in which the
plaintiff's burden of proof has been particularly forbidding; that is, to
situations wherein:
... there is no evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, at least none
of sufficient probative value, to show negligence, apart from the
postulate-which rests upon common experience and not upon
the specific circumstances of the instant case-that the physical
causes of the kind which produced the accident in question do not
ordinarily exist in the absence of negligence.
7
However, before the plaintiff may rely upon the "doctrine" to make out
a prima facie case, certain conditions must be present. Essentially these
are but a refinement of those first set out by Chief Justice Earle.8 One of
the more widely quoted, current expositions is that given by Professor
Prosser:
The conditions usually stated as necessary for the application of
the principle of res ipsa loquitur are three: 1) the accident must
be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence; 2) it must be caused by an agency or instru-
mentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; 3) it must
not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
4 Leonard and Maude E. Dietz, doing business as Dietz Industrial Company, the
jobber through whom the rope was purchased.
5 2 H. & C. 772, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).
6 "There must be reasonable evidence of negligence; but where the thing is shown
to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from want of care." Scott v. London & Katherine Docks Co., 3
H. & C. 596, 159 Eng. Rep. 665 (1865).
7 141 A.L.R. 1016 (1942).
8 Supra note 6.
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part of the plaintiff. Some courts have added a fourth condition,
of dubious validity, that the evidence as to the true explanation
of the accident must be more readily accessible to the defendant
than to the plaintiff.9 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, the court in its opinion observed that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur presents one aspect of circumstantial evidence and that
the two terms are not mutually exclusive. The court referred to Cobb v.
Marshal Field & Co., l0 wherein it was said:
In a res ipsa l6quitur case there is an inference of negligence
arising from circumstantial evidence. Although this is often called
a "presumption" it is really a presumption of fact and not of law.
Such an inference, or presumption, does not disappear when con-
trary evidence appears; it remains to be considered with all the
other evidence in the case and must be weighed by the jury.
In the principal case, as in other typical res ipsa loquitur cases, the
specific negligent act or defect that was the proximate cause of the injury
was unknown to the plaintiff. Thus, he was forced to rely upon those
meager facts of which he had knowledge, and the surrounding circum-
stances, to sustain the burden of proof necessary to make out a prima
facie case, leaving it to the trier of fact to draw the presumption" of
negligence from such showings. This is perhaps the most significant
aspect of the doctrine; it enables a plaintiff so situated to get his case to
the jury. On this point Harper and James observe: "And since juries in-
cline heavily toward plaintiffs (especially in cases likes these) the net
practical effect of the doctrine is to shift the substantive burden of loss
from unexplained accidents of these types from plaintiffs to defendants.'12
Because the plaintiff is not required to disprove every hypothesis suggest-
ing a cause other than the defendant's negligence,18 the burden of going
forward with the evidence shifts from the plaintiff to the defendant to
explain or rebut the inference of negligence. Contrary to an earlier position
adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court,14 after the defendant has come
9 Prosser, Torts 201 (2d ed. 1955).
10 22 Ill. App. 2d 143, 159 N.E.2d 520 (Ist Dist. 1959). The case involved an elevator,
located in the defendant's building, that fell while it was being operated by the plain-
tiffs, employees of a painting contractor hired by the defendant. At the time of the acci-
dent, the elevator was being used by the plaintiffs to move their equipment from an
upper floor storage area to a lower floor where they were to work. The court found that
the elevator had been recently inspected by City of Chicago elevator inspectors who re-
ported that it was in a safe and serviceable condition, with all the safety devices func-
tioning properly; that the maximum allowable weight was prominently posted in the
car; that the plaintiffs overloaded the car; and finally, that, after the accident, the elevator
was tested again and found to be operating properly. The jury returned a verdict for the
defendant which was affirmed on appeal.
11 The word "presumption," as used herein, is deemed to mean a mandatory, though
rebuttable, inference arising from the particular facts.
12 2 Harper and James, Torts 1081 (1956).
'3 May v. Columbian Rope, 40 111. App. 2d 264, 189 N.E.2d 394 (Ist Dist. 1963).
14 Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal, 341 111. 539, 173 N.E. 670 (1930). Defendant dentist
was extracting the plaintiff's tooth when the tooth broke and part of it passed down the
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forward and presented evidence as to the cause of the occurrence, the pre-
sumption of negligence still remains and should be considered by the trier
of fact.15
The general rule followed in most jurisdictions today is that the mere
happening of an accident does not, of itself, raise any presumption of
negligence on the defendant's part, and liability cannot be predicated upon
the mere happening of an accident.16 Therefore, it seems but proper that
the inferences drawn from the plaintiff's circumstantial evidence should be
tested to determine whether they warrant the jury's finding the defendant
negligent in his conduct toward the plaintiff. In the ordinary case based
upon circumstantial evidence, such inferences are tested. This test has been
variously expressed:
Where the conclusion is a matter of mere speculation or conjecture,
or where the probabilities are at best evenly balanced between
negligence and its absence, it becomes the duty of the court to
direct the jury that the burden of proof has not been sustained. 17
Another version is given in Nash v. Raun:'8 "If the plaintiff cannot show the
possibility of a conclusion of the defendant's negligence supported by a
clear preponderance of its likelihood . .. the plaintiff should not be per-
mitted to go to the jury."
Traditionally in cases in which the defendant relied upon the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, the courts followed the guidelines laid down by the
conditions necessary for the doctrine to apply;19 when the conditions were
present, the inferences were subjected to the test set out above.20 But of
late, the courts, particularly in Illinois, appear to be adopting a more lib-
eral approach. Not only has the test of the balance of probabilities seem-
ingly been abandoned,21 but also a more liberal trend is apparent in the
throat and lodged in the lung. The court states at page 542: "The doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is that whenever a thing which produces an injury is shown to have been under
the control and management of the defendant and the occurrence is such as in the ordi-
nary course of events does not happen if due care has been exercised, the fact of the
injury itself will be deemed to afford prima fade evidence to support a recovery in the
absence of any explanation by the defendant tending to show that the injury was not
due to his want of care. The presumption or inference of negligence raised by the appli-
cation of this doctrine is not absolute or conclusive but is rebuttable, and vanishes en-
tirely when even slight evidence appears to the contrary."
15 May v. Columbian Rope, supra note 13; Cobb v. Marshall Field & Co., supra
note 10.
16 Muss v. Wagner, 27 Ill. 2d 551, 190 N.E.2d 305 (1963); Adams v. J. C. Penny Co.,
411 Pa. 653, 192 A.2d 218 (1963); Brown v. Alabama Foods, 190 A.2d 257 (1963); Duchaine
v. Fortin, 192 A.2d 473 (1963); Bart de Latt & Assoc. v. Knight, 369 S.W.2d 65 (1963);
Weddle v. Draper, 204 Va. 319, 130 S.E.2d 462 (1963).
17 Prosser, Torts 200 (2d ed. 1955).
18 149 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1945).
19 Supra note 17, at 201.
20 Ford v. District of Columbia, 190 A.2d 904 (1963); Skipper v. Royal Crown Bottling
Co. of Wilmington, 192 A.2d 910 (1963).
21 Supra note 13. United States v. Ridolfi, 318 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1963). The test at
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courts' adherence to the guidelines established by the conditions. The trend
is particularly apparent as related to the condition requiring that the acci-
dent be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control
of the defendant. Today, the doctrine is held to apply not only to soft drink
bottles that explode, 22 but also to Coca-Cola bottles found to contain dead
mice; 23 to tea pots which break apart in the plaintiff's hands,24 and to ele-
vators that fall while being operated by the plaintiffs. 25 And now a new
situation presents itself; a rope that has passed from the exclusive control
of the defendant manufacturer, through the hands of a jobber and the
plaintiff's employer, into the hands of the plaintiff, breaks, causing the
plaintiff to fall. Herein, the court upheld the application of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, declaring that:
The demonstrable trend of these authorities is to determine from
the nature of the defective instrumentality and the surrounding
circumstances whether the inference of the defendant's negligence
is strong enough to survive the fact that, between the defendant's
control and the plaintiff's injury, another possession intervened.
If a reasonable inference does survive, liability has been imposed.26
It is submitted that the modern view more closely approaches what the doc-
trine was originally intended to be, i.e., a common-sense appraisal of the
probative value of circumstantial evidence.
best only provides a highly delusive standard, since there is no known scientific or mathe-
matical method to determine where the balance of probabilties lies.
22 Roper v. Dad's Root Beer Co., 336 I11. App. 91, 82 N.E.2d 815 (1st Dist. 1948).
Sometime after the bottle of root beer had left the exclusive control of the defendant,
it exploded, injuring the plaintiff. In affirming the judgment for the plaintiff the court
indicated, that upon a sufficient showing, liability for the resulting injury might be traced
to the defendant bottler, since it was in control of the bottle at the time of the alleged
negligence.
23 Duval v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 329 Ill. App. 290, 68 N.E.2d 479 (lst
Dist. 1946). The plaintiff claimed to have observed a dead mouse in the bottle while
drinking Coca-Cola bottled by the defendant and became ill. The defendant argued that
its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted because it
was not shown to have been in possession and control of the bottle at the time of the
plaintiff's injury. The court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and answered the
defendant's argument by saying, at p. 293: "We cannot take seriously any suggestion that
the mouse may have entered or been placed in the bottle while in the garage of the
salesman." Harris v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 35 Ill. App. 2d 406, 193 N.E.2d
56 (1st Dist. 1962). Recovery was allowed upon facts similar to those in the Duval case.
24 Johnson v. Stevens Bldg. Catering Co., 323 Ill. App. 212, 55 N.E.2d 550 (1st Dist.
1944). A waitress, employed by the defendant, passed a teapot to the plaintiff which
broke apart in the plaintiff's hands. In affirming the judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
the court reasoned that the inference of the defendant's negligence in preparing the pot
of tea survived the "intervening momentary" possession of the plaintiff.
25 Cobb v. Marshall Field & Co., 22 Ill. 2d App. 2d 143, 153, 154, 159 N.E.2d 520,
524, 525 (lst Dist. 1959). "The usual requirement that the accident-causing instrumenality
must be under the exclusive control of the defendant need not mean actual physical
control at the time of the accident, if the instrumentality is one which it is the defend-
ant's responsibility to maintain at all times and which responsibility cannot be delegated
by consent, agreement or usage."
26 May v. Columbian Rope, 40 Ill. App. 2d 264, 271, 189 N.E.2d 394 (1st Dist. 1963).
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Undoubtedly many factors are playing a part in shaping the progres-
sive attitude of the courts in their approach to res ipsa loquitur cases; but
it is submitted that these three are the most significant: (1) the impact of
liability insurance; (2) the high cost of expert testimony; and (3) the con-
cept of social insurance in conjunction with a growing belief that fault is
an outmoded criterion of liability. Of these three, the impact of liability
insurance is the most frequently acknowledged. The remaining two are
more subtle but more far-reaching in their effect.
The high cost of expert testimony is not only a matter of common
knowledge, but is quite generally conceded to be beyond the means of the
average plaintiff.27 On the other hand, the usual defendant is a business
enterprise of some kind, capable of sustaining the expense incurred through
the employment of such experts. When expert testimony is introduced, the
presiding judge must consider it, as well as those matters commonly known
to laymen, in determining the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa lo-
quitur to the particular case.28 It is not suggested that the courts disregard
such testimony and instead rely upon a priori conjectures and partly in-
formed hunches in reaching a decision. It is suggested that because of the
vast disparity in the relative ability of plaintiffs and defendants to sustain
the high costs incurred when experts are employed to testify, the courts in
some instances are prone to look with more favor upon the plaintiff's cause
than is warranted by the evidence introduced.
Lastly, what appears to be a growing disenchantment with fault as the
criterion of liability in the typical res ipsa loquitur case, may be but evi-
dence of the belief that the innocent victim of an unexplained accident
should not be sent forth from the courts as a man without a remedy.29 This
belief has served to focus attention upon the need felt by a number of jur-
ists for some form of social insurance to compensate such innocent victims
for their injuries, as workmen are compensated under existing workmen's
compensation laws. Such a program of social insurance would require legis-
lative action, and there has been, as yet, no such comprehensive enactment.
In the absence of such legislative enactments, the courts that have
adopted a more liberal attitude in their approach to res ipsa loquitur cases
have been prompted to do so by the specter of grievously injured plaintiffs,
innocent of any fault, being dismissed from the courts, uncompensated for
their pain and suffering. It is suggested that the court in the principal
case was so motivated.
L. M. JENNINGS
27 83 Time 48 (March 20, 1964).
28 Bradford v. Winter, 30 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1963).
29 Ill. Const. Art. II, § 19: "Every person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws
for all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or reputation;
he ought to obtain, by law, right and justice freely and without being obliged to purchase
it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay."

